High-Order Punishment and the Evolution of Cooperation

Baranski, B.1; Bartz-Beielstein, T.2; Ehlers, R.1; Kajendran, Th.1; Kossler, B.1; Mehnen, J.3, a; Polaszek, T.1; Reimholz, R.1; Schmidt, J.1; Schmitt, K.1; Seis, D.1; Slodzinski, R.1; Steeg, S.1; Wiemann, N.1; Zimmermann, M.1

1)
Lehrstuhl XI, Universität Dortmund, 44227 Dortmund, Germany
2)
Lehrstuhl Informatik VII, Universität Dortmund, Otto-Hahn-Str. 16, 44227 Dortmund
3)
Institut für Spanende Fertigung, Universität Dortmund, Baroper Str. 301, 44227 Dortmund

a) mehnen@isf.de

Kurzfassung

The Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Public Goods Game are models to study mechanisms leading to the evolution of cooperation. From a simplified rational and egoistic perspective there should be no altruistic cooperation in these games at all. Previous studies observed circumstances under which cooperation can emerge. This paper demonstrates the high-order punishment opportunities can maintain a higher cooperation level in an agent based simulation of the evolution of cooperation.

Schlüsselwörter

IPD, Public Goods Game, Cooperation, Punishment

Veröffentlichung

In: Proceedings of the Genetic and Evolutionary Computation Conference (GECCO 2006), 2006, Seattle, Washington, USA, Keijzer, M.; et al (Hrsg.), S. 379-380